Overview

In a significant decision for premises owners and occupiers, the Supreme Court of Texas has reaffirmed (and strictly enforced) the evidentiary burden plaintiffs must meet to establish constructive notice in slip‑and‑fall cases. In H‑E‑B, L.P. v. Marissa Peterson, the Court held that evidence of prior roof leaks elsewhere in a store, generalized inspection policies, or speculation about how a condition may have arisen cannot substitute for proof of how long the specific dangerous condition existed at the time and place of the injury.

The ruling reinforces a long‑standing but frequently litigated principle: without temporal evidence showing duration, a premises‑liability claim fails as a matter of law.

Factual Background

Marissa Peterson alleged she slipped and fell on a clear liquid puddle while shopping in the toy aisle of an H‑E‑B grocery store. She testified that after falling, she noticed water on the floor and observed water dripping from a ceiling rafter above the aisle. However, she had “no idea” how long the puddle had been present before she fell. Her companion initially said he saw water dripping from above the toy aisle about every ten or fifteen seconds, though he later recanted, admitting he had no idea where the water came from and assumed it was coming from the ceiling.

Peterson conceded she had no idea how long the puddle existed before her fall. Video evidence showed that rain in the area had stopped approximately two hours earlier and that no H‑E‑B employee had traversed the aisle during that time.

H‑E‑B presented evidence that, although the store had experienced roof leaks in other areas during a remodeling project, there were no documented leaks above the toy aisle either before or after the incident.

Plaintiff’s Position

Peterson acknowledged that she could not show H‑E‑B had actual knowledge of the puddle and instead relied on a constructive‑notice theory, arguing that the store’s history of roof leaks during renovations, the size of the puddle, the alleged dripping from above, and earlier rain suggested the condition had existed long enough to be discovered. She further contended that H‑E‑B’s heightened inspection protocols during rainstorms and the fact that no employee inspected the aisle for approximately two hours before her fall supported an inference of constructive knowledge.

H‑E‑B’s Position

H‑E‑B argued that Peterson failed to meet a threshold and core requirement of Texas premises‑liability law, specifically, evidence of duration. H‑E‑B argued there was no evidence showing when the puddle formed, that prior leaks elsewhere in the store were legally irrelevant to knowledge of a condition at a different location and time, and that evidence suggesting a possible cause of the puddle did not establish the duration of the dangerous condition itself.

Trial Court Ruling

The trial court granted summary judgment for H‑E‑B, concluding that Peterson failed to raise a fact issue on constructive notice. The court also excluded portions of Peterson’s expert testimony.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that evidence of roof leaks elsewhere in the store, combined with Peterson’s circumstantial evidence arguments, was sufficient to raise a fact issue on constructive knowledge (even without proof of duration at the specific aisle).

Supreme Court of Texas’ Holding

The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H‑E‑B.

The Court held that constructive notice in slip‑and‑fall cases requires actual temporal evidence demonstrating that the alleged dangerous condition existed long enough for a premises owner to reasonably discover it. Evidence of prior leaks or maintenance issues elsewhere on the property is insufficient because notice must relate to the specific condition at the time and place of the injury, not to antecedent circumstances that may have caused it. Likewise, speculation about how a condition formed (such as recent rain, a suspected ceiling drip, the size of a puddle, or the existence of inspection protocols) does not establish how long the condition existed. Nor do internal safety or inspection policies lower the plaintiff’s burden. Absent evidence of duration, such policies do not create constructive notice. The Court emphasized that it has repeatedly rejected efforts to relax this evidentiary requirement in slip‑and‑fall cases, even where proof may be difficult to obtain.

Why This Decision Matters

This opinion is a strong reaffirmation of premises‑liability principles and has several important implications for future slip‑and‑fall litigation. The Supreme Court of Texas made clear that cases without real evidence showing how long a hazard existed should be resolved at the summary‑judgment stage, rather than sent to a jury. Plaintiffs cannot rely on general circumstances (like weather, prior maintenance issues, or a company’s internal safety policies) to fill evidentiary gaps, and courts will not treat ordinary operational imperfections as proof that a business should have known about a short‑lived hazard.

Instead, the focus in slip-and-fall cases remains on whether the condition existed long enough to be discovered under the time-notice rule in Texas. By reinforcing that duration, not speculation, is the decisive issue, Peterson strengthens the ability of premises owners, occupiers, and insurers to defeat unsupported slip‑and‑fall claims at the summary judgment phase, even when the facts appear plausible, but are unsupported by evidence.